The Allied strategic bombing campaign helped the Red Army on
the Eastern Front by forcing the Germans to defend their homeland with large
quantities of 88mm antiaircraft guns. Here are the details. The German 88mm antiaircraft gun was the undisputed
best antitank gun during the early parts of WWII and arguably the best overall.
The main contributors to the 88’s effectiveness were its light weight carriage
and speed of deployment joined with excellent muzzle velocity. The gun could go from the towed configuration
to ready to fire in under 3 minutes with a trained crew. There were roughly 21,000 88’s made before
and during the war. The increasing tempo
of Allied strategic bombing raids on the German homeland and occupied
territories in 1943 and 1944 constituted a virtual second front, particularly
with regard to 88’s. About 10,000 88’s
were deployed in an antiaircraft role to defend against Allied bombers. These guns were not all that effective
against the bombers, but they would have been devastating against Russian
tanks. The Russians manufactured about
35,000 T-34 tanks and 29,500 T-34-85 tanks.
These two types were what the Red Army used to win on the Eastern
Front. Both were very vulnerable to
German 88’s. While it’s hard to know
exactly how many 88’s were in use on the Eastern Front, estimates are in the
range of 2,000-4,000. The devastation of
5,000 additional 88’s killing thousands of T-34 and T-34-85 tanks would at
least arguably have stopped the Red Army from taking Berlin. So the Allied strategic bombing of Germany
contributed the vital factor of keeping German 88’s away from the Eastern Front
to facilitate the Red Army’s advance.
Saturday, January 24, 2015
Monday, December 15, 2014
Was Pearl Harbor a Surprise? by Douglas Bohrer
Everybody knows today what
was very secret in 1941. We had broken
the Japanese code. So how could the
attack on Pearl Harbor have been a surprise?
I believe it should not have been
a total surprise, but it was. We had broken the Japanese diplomatic code, which
was based on the Purple Machine variant of the German Enigma machine. That
said, we had not developed methods to distribute top secret cryptographic
intelligence in a secure way. As a result, Washington gave commanders a general
war warning based on the intercepts, but withheld details in order not to
reveal that we had broken the Japanese code. We also had not broken the
Japanese Naval codes, so we had no detailed knowledge of what was coming and
when. When we broke the diplomatic message we intercepted on December 7
announcing the attack, we did not notify combat commanders because there was no
safe communication channel to do so. Later in the war, there was a whole
specialized structure built to handle the distribution of "Ultra"
source intelligence, as intercepted decoded messages were called. Part of the reason the structure was built was the
breakdown at Pearl Harbor.
The best book I have
found on this subject is "Pearl Harbor Final Judgement" by Henry
Clausen and Bruce Lee. Mr. Clausen was appointed by Secretary of War Stimson as
the official investigator to find out why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor. Here's
a link to a review of the book:
http://www.amgot.org/phclausn.htm
The book I read about how "Ultra" intelligence was distributed is "The Ultra Secret" by F W Winterbotham. A review of the book which includes a warning of the book's inaccuracies and exaggerations is here:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol19no3/html/v19i3a05p_0001.htm
http://www.amgot.org/phclausn.htm
The book I read about how "Ultra" intelligence was distributed is "The Ultra Secret" by F W Winterbotham. A review of the book which includes a warning of the book's inaccuracies and exaggerations is here:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol19no3/html/v19i3a05p_0001.htm
This is a link to my LinkedIn discussion of this topic. It has further elaboration.
Wednesday, September 24, 2014
Battle of the Cowpens, 17 January 1781 by Douglas Bohrer
This decisive American victory over the British army
has fascinated me since I read about it in high school. What brought it to mind recently was a friend’s
Facebook posting of “On this date in history” noting the birthday of Banastre
Tarleton. American Brigadier General
Daniel Morgan gave British Colonel Banastre Tarleton a severe thrashing at the
Battle of the Cowpens. At the end of the
battle, Tarleton was riding for his life, pursued by American cavalry. My interest in the battle itself is that it
followed the tactical deployments of two of Hannibal’s famous battles in the
Punic Wars, Cannae (216 BCE) and Zama (202 BCE).
Daniel Morgan used the known strengths and weaknesses of his men very well. He had a lot of militia that were very good shots, but unused to fighting as disciplined units. Some arrived as late as the night before the battle. Morgan had a first line of sharpshooters and then a line of militia out in front. Their orders were to wait until the enemy was well within range, fire 2-3 times and retreat to the left so they would not get in the way of the lines behind them. Morgan’s third line was composed of veteran Continental soldiers and well trained state militia which included some veterans with Continental experience. It’s almost certain this third line had bayonets, which were deadly in hand to hand combat during this period. Militia lacked bayonets. Militia had a reputation for running from British regular troops because of their justified fear of facing bayonets. Morgan also had cavalry units, which he kept out of sight at the start of the battle. Morgan probably had slightly less than 2,000 men. Morgan had spent most of the previous evening circulating among the men explaining his plan so everyone knew his part.
Tarleton had a mixed force of infantry and cavalry, including Loyalist American and Regular British Army units totaling about 1,150. Tarleton’s troops were hungry and tired. They had run out of food two days before. They had been marching since 2 AM because Tarleton was afraid Morgan would escape. When Tarleton finally caught up to Morgan, there was no tactical subtlety at all. Tarleton charged straight in.
The American sharpshooters and militia each did as they were ordered. The sharpshooters killed several British officers. Both lines inflicted quite a few casualties. Tarleton saw the second retreat as evidence the battle was over. His men broke ranks and charged. They hit the solid line of experienced men with bayonets and went nowhere. Then American cavalry came out on one side, and the militia came back on the other flank. Most of the British force surrendered. Tarleton fled on horseback.
The interesting thing to me is that the tactics mimic two of Hannibal’s battles. The double envelopment which surrounded the British force at the Battle of the Cowpens is very rare in history. Most historians of the Cowpens compare it to the most famous early recorded battle where a double envelopment happened, Cannae (216 BCE). Hannibal defeated the Romans by surrounding their army from both flanks at the same time and wiping it out.
I haven’t seen one account of the Cowpens that notes the similarity to Zama (202 BCE). At Zama, Hannibal deployed his troops in three lines that were not allowed to retreat into the line behind them. Hannibal lost the battle because he was out thought by Scipio Africanus. However, note that Morgan used three lines that were not allowed to retreat through the lines behind them at the Cowpens.
The use of two of Hannibal’s battle plans is especially odd because Daniel Morgan was very poorly educated. While not much is known of his early life in New Jersey, when he arrived in Virginia after running away from home he could barely read and write. The man was a bar room brawler, not a classical scholar. To my mind, the similarity to two Punic War battles can’t be coincidence. Morgan must have known about them. The question is how did he know?
As a postscript, Americans were especially happy to thrash Banastre Tarleton. Colonel Tarleton was notorious for permitting the slaughter of American troops who had surrendered at the Battle of Waxhaws, 29 May 1780. Patriots thought his embarrassing defeat at the Battle of the Cowpens was a just reward. The fact Tarleton had to flee for his life was icing on the cake.
Bibliography
Battle
of Cowpens: The Miracle Battle of the American Revolution (Revolution &
Founding Series Book 1) by U.S. Army War College (Mar 12, 2012)
The Battles of Kings Mountain and Cowpens: The
American Revolution in the Southern Backcountry (Critical Moments... by Melissa A. Walker (Feb 11, 2013)
Cowpens Staff Ride
and Battlefield Tour by LTC John Moncure (Mar 8, 2012)
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